There are many more points that can be raised in this discussion, and I will bring them forth in due course. In the meantime, look at the difference between the current severe weather warnings in Queensland and New South Wales. Queensland has a severe weather warning for 'heavy rain' (all in small font) whereas NSW has a severe weather warning for 'flash flooding' (in bold print). Now what does heavy rain mean? It has no reference to flash flooding whatsoever. What gives? This is just one of many anomalies between the jurisdictions.
It's funny Clem, I've noticed this same difference in the last few weeks...even the key phrases to describe the weather phenomena in warnings differ from state to state amongst the same warning. I am confident that the same weather situation would generate 'heavy rain' in a QLD SWW and 'flash flooding' in a NSW SWW. This is a little nitpicky and there are more important things to worry about - but surely they all should be writing from the same template!
from SEQ water
Water Release Update (Friday 7 January, 9.00am)
Wivenhoe Dam
Gate operations will commence when flood levels in the lower Lockyer Creek subside.
Local Councils are being advised that local flows, and the expected Wivenhoe release, may impact upon Twin Bridges, Savages Crossing, Burtons Bridge, Kholo Bridge and Colleges Crossing for several days.
At this stage, no adverse impacts are expected for Fernvale Bridge, or Mt Crosby Weir Bridge.
This was posted on the Friday before and is a copy of an SEQ water release update. Now this was released in the midst of continuous SWWs for flash flooding and a potential worsening of existing flooded rivers. Of course, Lockyer Creek never did subside - what were they thinking then? (More about Lockyer Creek below.)
And this only half an hour before the above SEQ Water Release Update:
TOP PRIORITY FOR IMMEDIATE BROADCAST
SEVERE WEATHER WARNING
for heavy rainfall leading to localised flash flooding and potentially worsening
the existing river flood situation
For people in the Southeast Coast and Wide Bay and Burnett forecast districts.
Issued at 8:25 am on Friday 7 January 2011
Synoptic Situation: At 7am EST, an upper level low was located over the
Capricornia district while a low level trough was located off the Capricorn
coast. These systems will combine to produce further rain areas and
thunderstorms over the Southeast Coast and Wide Bay and Burnett forecast
districts.
It is obvious, in light of the current Dam/Flood inquiry that SEQ took no notice of these SWWs in their assessment of the current and future dam releases on the Friday before the disastrous floods, notwithstanding forecasts of existing and future heavy rain exacerbating already flooded rivers.
I am not a hydrologist or engineer, however I have learnt a lot about catchments and the way dams etc work in the past year or two and this is one of the things that I think I've figured out:
I believe the way the dams operate are based on what water is flowing in the catchment and in the dams themselves, not what is still in the air and yet to fall. This is because weather forecasts are not quite accurate enough yet for engineers/hydrologists to get very far into the future with any sort of certainty for forward planning.
A prime example of why weather forecasts are not used is the dam scenario that is currently being thrashed out by the flood commission in the period Jan 8-11 last year. Forecast rainfall during this period (particularly the 9th through 11th) was mostly below the dam (ie: in the Bremer, Logan/Albert and lower
Brisbane catchments, and over the border in the Northern Rivers). If they had've released water from the dam to give themeslves more headroom in the following days, forecasts favoured a situation where a big flood could be sent through
Brisbane, with very heavy rainfall falling in non-controlled water courses, with releases from the dams only making things worse. As we now know, most of the water from this event fell ABOVE Wivenhoe Dam wall (with two 1974-style rain events thrown at the dam in the space of 48 hours), which nobody would've been able to forecast with a high level of confidence back on Jan 8.
Here's some of the detail from the model runs at around the time of the 7th and 8th that show the positioning more clearly than the 1-4 day acccumulated falls for Australia:
00z run 7th Jan for the 9th

00z run 8th Jan for the 10th

(You can tell that I have a bit of a bee in my bonnet about some parts of the dam engineer witch hunt going on at the flood commission currently

)
Now to the question of
who does flash flood warnings:According to the transcripts from when the flood commission questioned Jim Davidson - Local Government is charged with the issuing of flash flood warnings.
Now this is all a bit complicated, because the Bureau mention 'flash flooding' where applicable in their Severe Thunderstorm Warnings (for example today it got a constant run where 'damaging winds', 'large hail' etc weren't applicable on this occasion). The key difference here is that the Bureau are not responsible for flash flood warnings in specific creeks and rivers (which is where it is deferred to local government), but they do warn for flash flooding over broader areas in their SWW's and STW's.
Having said all this (next bee in my bonnet here, apologies again

), the Bureau can (and have in the past) warned for individual severe thunderstorms producing flash flooding in the past while the broader SWW is in place. This most recently occured a week or two ago. Today's STW was quickly issued for a specific cell when Laidley recorded 52mm in 30 mins, but on January 10 there was complete silence from their end when Redbank Creek recorded 111mm (most of which fell in the space of an hour or so) under the storm when it was west of Esk, and beginning to move over the upper Lockyer Valley.
Depending on the way you measure it, there was '4 hours of silence' between the very heavy rainfall recorded W of Esk by 1pm, and the 'flash flood warning' that the Bureau issued at 5pm. This embarrassing sequence of events is only made worse when you see the post of mine that you highlighted where I pasted the updated Lockyer Creek flood warning, issued an hour after the Helidon flood gauge spike. While this warning would've been issued by hydrologists who also largely operate on what water is sitting in the catchment, surely somebody in the entire
Brisbane BoM office would've been looking at the
radar and as a result, keeping an eye on the Helidon flood gauge, expecting to see some sort of spike there? Not to mention that by 4pm, flood footage from Toowoomba had already been on the TV stations for a good hour or so.
Anyway - what is the point of me ranting about Jan 10 again?
It is that no matter how good or bad a system is, if the captain is asleep at the wheel, then there is certainly not going to be any sort of good result for the general public! This is not the only example of the Bureau being slow to react to situations like this - March 9, 2001 generated the infamous 'Bureau's 2 hours of silence' front cover on the Courier Mail. They were also quite sluggish during the Coomera River flood of Feb 7 2010 (which should've been a wakeup call and 'refresher/practice' for them less than 12 months before Jan 2011)
Now this poses the question: how do these local government authorities and the BoM exchange information and warnings data?
The problem of communication is real as the following from the same report attests:
Providing effective warnings for flash flooding. This is currently a major gap across Australia. Technical advances may now make flash flood warnings feasible, but the issues of rapid decision making by all the agencies involved and by those at risk would need to be addressed. (My bold)
Indeed.
They seem to have a pretty good exchange of live data through what they call the 'ALERT network' I think. Various agencies have installed flood gauges across the country, and I believe they are pretty much all linked up on the Bureau's page.
In the capital cities especially (with the high resolution radars that have the 'accumulated rainfall' as estimated by the
radar), you could forecast flash flooding in fairly specific locations to a pretty high accuracy when combining with the network of flood gauges and auto rain gauges. In fact the Bureau would probably do something similar now using some of these tools in order to produce their STW's at times. Going back to the Jan 10 example again, you probably could've issued an STW for that cell just based on the accumulated precip as measured by the Mt Stapylton
radar. Its a pretty handy tool, and in my experience has lined up pretty well with the actual falls from the auto gauge network that get mentioned in warnings. Even if it doesn't get the actual totals spot on, at the very least it highlights the areas where the heaviest rain has fallen and from there you can start to assess the flash flood potential.
Speaking of flood gauges - I am looking forward to the new gauges on Coffs Creek being linked up to the Bureau's page, this will be an incredibly valuable resource for my home town!